Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
REPORT DATE

MAR 2005
2
IRAN'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY OPTIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The continuing spread of nuclear weapons will increase the likelihood of this kind of frightening possibility: small states can be more easily invaded by nuclear neighbors, since that neighbor may believe that its new weapons will deter intervention by outside powers.
-Scott D. Sagan
WHY IRAN
The discovery of Iran's nuclear program and its recent failure to comply fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Agreements has pushed Iran to the center of international attention. 2 Despite denials, Iran's delays in explaining inconsistencies in IAEA findings and safeguards raises alarms that its nuclear efforts are being diverted to weapons development. 3 To gain an appreciation for Iran's approach to nuclear weapons, one needs only to look at the geopolitical environment of Southwest Asia and the greater Middle
East. To the East, Iran finds two nuclear powers in India and Pakistan whose mutual enmity could have disastrous consequences. Given its acrimonious history with the United States and with U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran is increasingly concerned about U.S. influence in the region. Add nuclear-armed Israel to the situation and Iran suddenly finds itself in a hostile environment with credible influence waning and increasing isolation. 4 As the world suddenly finds itself taking note of Iran's legal and elicit attempts to gain nuclear capabilities, questions arise as to the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in prohibiting unsanctioned nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear weapons remain one of the most dangerous threats to world survival. Organized a little over three decades ago, the NPT established an important international security framework. 5 It limited the actions of nuclear weapons states (NWS), restrained non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) from acquiring nuclear weapons, and framed other cooperative agreements to control proliferation. 6 The recent increase in the number of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related crises, such as those with Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran suggest a stressed nonproliferation regime. 7 Only as good as its member states, the NPT requires steadfast commitment to its charter and policing mechanisms.
Western nations expect NPT signatories to comply with the safeguards as set forth by the IAEA. It is a binding U.N. treaty agreed to voluntarily and subject to international norms. Most of the world has agreed that promoting peaceful nuclear capabilities for economic benefit best serves humankind as evidenced by their signatures to the NPT. However, discovery of attempts to use peaceful nuclear programs to create nuclear weapons has more than just revealed the scope of illicit activities. It has forced the world to acknowledge that irresponsible nations and terrorists may synchronize their activities to acquire nuclear capabilities. This terrorist aspect of nuclear proliferation directly affronts international norms and causes great alarm.
This work explores Iran's apparent attempt to develop a nuclear weapons option. Iran has acquired considerable nuclear expertise in recent years through overt and covert activities, including civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia and likely connections with elements of Pakistan's nuclear weapons establishment. Some of these activities are counter to Western nonproliferation expectations, worrisome for stability in the greater Middle East, and dangerous for long-term U.S. strategic interests. Iran's movement toward a nuclear weapon option creates complex issues for American national security policy makers and highlights the international community's inability to police rogue states effectively. This research examines Iran's nuclear program and assesses the merits and risks of various U.S. policy options in response. It also argues that Iran's nuclear intent has produced unique opportunities for U.S. foreign policy makers to shape international norms in support of U.S. interests. Iran to master the nuclear fuels manufacturing process and other critical technologies. In turn this knowledge will reduce Iran's reliance on outside sources and vulnerabilities to exposure. 18 Western attempts to gain insights into the Iranian program will become more difficult and increase suspicion about Iranian intentions. This change will allow Iran gradually to become self-sufficient in the fuels process while reducing visibility to the outside world. If it achieves its goals, Iran will also reduce internal dependency on oil giving it more product to market, thus increasing revenues. Intelligence Agency (CIA) sources of ongoing discussions between Russian agencies and Iran over sale of a uranium conversion facility, a heavy water reactor, and contracts for a uranium mine. 22 The United States subsequently administered sanctions against the Russian companies involved for their proliferation efforts. Yet Russia persists in providing nuclear technology to developing countries for financial gain and, as some have maintained, because of lax enforcement of export rules. 23 Russia may one day regret its failure to provide adequate oversight of its nuclear exports and controls if, for example, a Chechen terrorist acquires a nuclear device.
IRAN'S OVERT AND COVERT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
CONNECTIONS WITH PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENT
According to Douglas Jehl, the CIA succeeded in infiltrating Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation network over a period of years. 24 The detection of Khan's clandestine network helped expose the extent of the proliferation problem around the world and illustrated the ability of Khan to distribute nuclear expertise and technology across international borders. 25 To comprehend the challenges of Khan's transnational efforts it is necessary to gain familiarity with his ability to transcend borders. Khan reportedly began clandestine efforts to produce fissile material using information from Uranium Enrichment Company (URENCO) North Korea. 31 The interception and subsequent investigation also exposed the magnitude of the Khan network to the entire world. Libya's admission of Iran's culpability, forced Iran to admit Khan's assistance. 32 While the actual beginning of Iran's association with Khan remains unknown, in 2004
Pakistan acknowledged that two of its scientists including Khan assisted Iran during the 1980s. 33 Together the reports signify Iran's implication in these covert efforts and further suggest it may be moving toward a nuclear weapon option. 34 As a result, the IAEA increased its focus on Iran's program. The ensuing Director General's November 2004 report to the Board of Governors on Iran's implementation of IAEA safeguards includes a chronological list of discrepancies, delays, and still unresolved issues with the program. 35 The regime's success to that point hallmarks the failure of current IAEA rules to afford some measure of confidence in its ability to safeguard national security throughout the world. Until the IAEA gains unfettered access to the world's nuclear sites, doubts will continue to generate speculation on potential adversary intent.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Iran's belief in the unfair application of the NPT to itself and other Muslim nations has some merit. It provides political will and national legitimacy for Iran to use all instruments of power to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability. American policy as a contributor to proliferation and justification for others to desire nuclear weapons. 45 As one of the more fungible elements of power, economic strength improves from sales in the highly lucrative market for nuclear technology. The United States and Canada's research reactor sale to India, France's reactor sale to Iraq, and Russia's reactor sale to Iran provide a few infamous examples, and there are numerous others. 46 The desire for profit pushes states to sell sensitive commodities that later may be misused to support weapons programs. It is possible that huge segments of the Iranian population will support nuclear programs for either economic benefits or the deterrence benefit against the United States. If so, the political challenges to care for its internal needs thereby endearing the population to the theocracy create an advantage for U.S. policy makers. Whether Iran implodes, an outside power removes its regime, or the forces of connectivity and democratization triumph remains unknown. Proper application of U.S. diplomatic efforts is necessary to shape the volatile region to meet U.S. strategic goals.
Perceptions of inequitable application of the NPT safeguards contribute to regional instability as developing nations follow NWS lead in adhering only to safeguards of their choosing. Nuclear weapons states not complying with arms reductions, or at least addressing the difficulties involved in an international forum, add value to having nuclear weapons in the region. Fear of potential Israeli action encourages nations to hasten their efforts to protect themselves. If Iran succeeds in dividing the IAEA Board of Governors, it may embolden others to challenge U.S. influence in the region creating an increased potential for conflict. Conversely, the economic benefits to peaceful nuclear proliferation by free market flow creates a stabilizing effect in the region, assuming the country gaining nuclear technology will use it for peaceful purposes only.
DANGERS TO U.S. INTERESTS
The most obvious danger to the Western world is an Iranian nuclear device provided to a non-state actor willing to die for a cause. The inherent difficulty of developing strategies to counter terrorist threats is the most vexing issue of the day. Determining when and where the terrorist will strike requires an ability to locate them and gather reliable information that uniquely identifies the organization.
Iran certainly understands the negative political ramifications that would occur if the United
States were to unleash nuclear weapons upon it. Iran may also believe that with nuclear weapons, it will be able to deter the United States from a conventional attack. Also feasible is an option that Iran can attack a neighbor, while deterring an attack upon itself with its nuclear weapons. A nuclear capable Iran will certainly cause U.S. policy makers to consider carefully the cost in national treasure before taking military action against Iran. Israel remains the most prominent threat to Iran and all of its Arab neighbors as long as it maintains unconditional U.S.
support. 47 An Iranian nuclear threat directed to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Organization of Petroleum States in an effort to control oil prices could upset the flow of oil through the region and have a dramatic impact on the world economy. Tehran could provide a nuclear device to Hezbollah or Hamas to carry out a threat or detonation. Terrorist aspiration to use a nuclear device to influence the Israeli-Palestinian situation constitutes a grave danger to regional and world stability.
Regional crises in the past such as the Iraq-Iran War have interrupted infrastructure and distribution with adverse effects on world oil markets. 48 Once threatened, neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey may be inclined to obtain nuclear options of their own.
Proliferation to these states also represents an increase in the likelihood a device will be lost simply by the increase in numbers. Reports are already coming from Egypt that it has initiated a uranium research project which thus far appears to be civilian oriented. 49 The willingness of friendly nations to work with Iran lends credence to the perception of immoderate U.S. reactions and undermines U.S. influence in the region.
In spite of U.S. attempts, Iran has succeeded in demonstrating U.S. ineffectiveness toward moderating its behavior. Iran sponsored Shiite Muslim extremist groups in failed attempts to coerce the GCC states during the 1980s and early 90s. 52 The U.S. Congress recently extended 1996 legislation to punish Iran's terrorism support by enforcing sanctions. 53 In IAEA scrutiny of their own programs. 55 These few non-compliers illustrate the difficulty of safeguards when ambitious nations, given the chance to acquire a considerable improvement in state power, accept the offer. These nations are raising the specter of anarchy to a higher level.
Additional crises add to the problems with which an already stressed U.S. military and intelligence apparatus have to contend. Many nations under U.S. leadership have signed on to the Proliferation Security Initiative to interrupt shipments of WMD and related materials flowing throughout the world. 56 Nations are acting alone or in concert with others creating the risk of sending the IAEA and the NPT regime into obscurity. These non-complying states are not new problems for the United States, but they do add urgency to the necessity of bringing the NPT up to date with accountability mechanisms and punitive awards for non-adherence.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
For the trans-Atlantic alliance, Iran's nuclear agenda has forged a consensus between the United States and Europe that preventing Iran's nuclear option is vitally important to both. Yet, they disagree in principal as to how to proceed. Within the EU, Europeans have not synchronized diplomatic efforts among themselves as they have recently discovered. Some EU countries are engaging Iran on trade and aid issues while separate negotiations are focusing on proliferation. 57 The Europeans must first figure out which voice they will use to address the world. Then with unity of effort the United States and Europe will be more effective in prohibiting Iran and others from taking advantage of diplomatic tiffs as in the past. 58 Thus far the effect of Iran's proliferation efforts has provided both sides of the Atlantic a common view of the international nuclear environment from which to work.
From Iran's point of view its nuclear weapons program has nationalistic, economic, and prestige implications. Its aspirations to be a great nation or a regional power may be aided by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear programs provide jobs for Iranians and if successful, will enable Iran to reduce its internal dependence on oil. Iran is currently conducting crude oil swaps from the Caspian Sea using the lower quality oil internally and selling more of its own higher quality oil to world markets. 59 Accomplishing its nuclear program will free Iran to sell even more oil to world markets increasing goods and services to its people. Although short- Once distracted, developing nations discard the leader's policies with disdain for their selfserving directions. The United States must resolve itself to the moral high ground, take responsibility for its own omissions, and once again lead world diplomatic efforts that have served it so well.
The United States and Russia have done little to bolster world confidence working towards nuclear disarmament. Between them one finds the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought U.S. assistance to account for and secure Russian tactical nuclear weapons that remained mostly in former Soviet Republics. The process by some estimates will take over 13 years to complete. 62 In the early 1990s the Group of Eight United States is also encouraging aid to the nations of Belarus and Kazakhstan for their disarmament efforts. 63 These admirable efforts move the issues away from the IAEA whose charter it is to monitor and report on national efforts to control proliferation. 65 Having determined that nuclear proliferation is important to national interests, some states are choosing to act in concert with others unconstrained by the consensus requirements of the nonproliferation regime. This activity itself is a good indicator of the need to revise the NPT. The
United States can show leadership here by allowing Russia to lead continuing efforts to locate, account for, and secure nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states. It can strongly support a Russian lead in creating bilateral agreements to reduce significantly the nuclear arms of both countries. The United States can invite China, the United Kingdom, Israel, Pakistan, India and
France to participate in genuine negotiations fostering cooperation. These efforts will positively demonstrate to Iran that its view of the United States not being in compliance with the NPT is not valid while removing any legitimacy questions. Taking the lead on nuclear disarmament will provide assurances to Russia as to U.S. intent and provide opportunities to close NPT loopholes that facilitate nuclear proliferation.
Beginning with the next safeguards conference, the United States should build consensus to close the loopholes in the NPT treaty. There are indications now the U.S. administration intends to close the loopholes that allow nations to participate in peaceful programs, opt out of the treaty, and then develop a nuclear weapon. But instead of renegotiating the NPT, the United
States wants the treaty rewritten without a vote producing a document that coincides with its original purpose of ensuring international security. 66 Consensus will not come cheaply and is likely to incite great debate among treaty members on the proposed change to the NPT. It may require the United States to reign in Israel. Israel is going to have to open its facilities and materials to safeguards, just as Iran. Israel will not have to give up its weapons, but it will have to become a participating member of the NPT. Pending completion of a revised Israeli security strategy, the United States must be prepared to offer significant additional security guarantees.
If Israel is willing to solve its long-term security issues, declaring its nuclear weapons and joining the NPT is a start. Iran and many of its neighbors have on paper committed to a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Israel's entry into disarmament talks will demonstrate progress to Islamic nations and lessen their security concerns. If the world finds a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Israeli nuclear program under the NPT will be a subject for upcoming Islamic debates. Finally, until restoration U.S. diplomatic prestige, the United States should continue to follow and support the EU in its negotiations with Iran to bring that country back into compliance with NPT safeguards.
WORD COUNT=5868
